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This paper asks whether new technological capacity for producing and exporting additional 
products provides incentives for greater capital accumulation, without being fully reflected in 
a higher rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth.  Using a highly disaggregated data set 
of each country’s trade flows into the United States (from 1972-94, disaggregated into over 
1000 rather than 10s of product categories, and containing over 1 million data points), we 
construct a direct and independent measure of technological improvements for each country 
over time based on the number of new product varieties exported to the United States.  We 
show, in a panel data setting, that acquiring the technological capacity for producing new 
products stimulates more rapid capital accumulation in developing countries, even after 
holding fixed the rate of TFP growth.  Our findings provide evidence against the alternative 
view that technological improvements are essentially unimportant: a view based on the 
findings of Young (1995) and others that instances of spectacular economic growth have 
been associated with unspectacular rates of TFP growth.  We provide a model to demonstrate 
how an expansion in the technological capacity for producing additional products can lead to 
more rapid factor accumulation, without necessarily improving measured TFP.  The findings 
of this paper suggest that while rapid accumulation of physical and human capital may have 
characterized the East Asian growth experience, these gains were stimulated by stellar 
improvements in technological capacity. 
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Since the late 1990s, India has been in the midst of a rapid accumulation of human
capital and skill. In Bangalore, Hyderabad, and elsewhere, large numbers of Aptech
and other training centers have been churning out skilled programmers for the coun-
try’s export-oriented software industry. Often, these individuals are paying many
times more for a three month course in programming than they would be paying for
a full year in a college degree program. Where did this all start? People close to the
software industry will tell you that the arrival of the internet, coupled with the ﬂurry
of Y2K projects, created an enormous demand for programmers in India.1 This has
provided a great incentive for individuals to educate themselves in the skills required
in the industry.
The point is that human and physical capital are not accumulated in a vacuum.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to examine the eﬀect of technological
improvements on capital accumulation. In particular, we ask whether new technolog-
ical capacity for producing and exporting additional products provides incentives for
greater capital accumulation, without being fully reﬂected in a higher rate of total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) growth. Using a highly disaggregated data set of trade ﬂows
to the United States (by country of origin, from 1972-94, disaggregated into over 1000
rather than 10s of product categories, and containing over 1 million data points), we
construct a direct and independent measure of technological improvements for each
country over time, based on the number of new product varieties exported to the
United States. We show, in a panel data setting, that acquiring the technological
capacity for producing new products leads to more rapid accumulation of capital in
developing countries, even after holding ﬁxed the rate of TFP growth.2
1These two exogenous events likely had a more pronounced eﬀect in delivering projects to India
than to other countries because of a large Indian expatriate presence in the US software industry.
2We focus on the accumulation of physical capital. However, preliminary tests indicate that
technological improvements also have a positive impact on the incentives to accumulate human
capital.
2The role of technological progress in the growth process has been a subject of much
debate. A good part of this debate is oriented around various interpretations of the
growth accounting exercise, which ﬁnds that during rapid growth episodes, the mea-
sured rates of TFP growth have been quite unspectacular.3 In fact, Krugman (1994)
has used this ﬁnding to suggest that technological improvements were essentially
unimportant in generating the high growth episodes in East Asia during the last four
decades. We disagree with this interpretation because the simple decomposition of the
growth accounting exercise lacks power to make causal interpretations. The ﬁndings
of the paper suggest that while rapid accumulation of capital may have characterized
the East Asian growth experience, these high rates of accumulation were stimulated
by stellar improvements in technological capacity. Moreover, the improvements in
technological capacity were not fully reﬂected in higher rates of TFP growth.
There are a myriad of reasons why technological improvements may not be reﬂected
in measured TFP growth rates.4 As is well known, calculations of TFP growth
are highly sensitive to the choice of the capital share in income. Even if the capital
share can be estimated from the data, in most cases, data limitations allow this to be
estimated at only one point in time. This one point estimate of the capital share is
then used to compute TFP growth rates for the country at diﬀerent points in time.
However, if the production function has a less than unitary elasticity of substitution,
then clearly capital deepening will cause the capital share of income to fall over time,
so that the calculated TFP growth rates will be biased downward. Furthermore, as
Rodrik (1997) shows, even if the data allow a distinct capital share to be computed
for each time period, with a less than unitary elasticity of substitution and substantial
labor augmenting technological progress, the calculated TFP growth rates will fail
to reﬂect the substantial technological improvements.
The model presented in this paper provides another reason for why measured TFP
growth rates may not accurately reﬂect improvements in technological capacity. Our
3See Young (1995).
4See, for example, Rodrik (1997), Hsieh (1999), and Young (1998).
3model merges a Dornbusch, Fischer, Samuelson (1977) model of international trade
and product specialization with an AK version of the Ramsey model of accumulation.
An increase in the range of products over which a country has expertise initially
raises TFP and stimulates greater accumulation. However, greater accumulation in
turn induces a decline in TFP back to its initial level as the country experiences
a deterioration in its terms of trade.5 Thus, our model clariﬁes how acquiring the
technological capacity for producing and exporting additional products can lead to a
higher rate of capital accumulation, but not be reﬂected in a higher measured rate of
TFP growth in the long run.
Conceptually, if output and inputs are measured perfectly in constant prices, we will
not necessarily want our measures of TFP growth to be aﬀected by changes in terms
of trade. However, in practice, there are a number of reasons why terms of trade
changes can aﬀect measured TFP growth rates. In very simple terms, whenever the
constant price base year is updated in national accounts, the relative weights placed
on diﬀerent products change. If a country experiences a terms of trade deterioration
in products experiencing rapid productivity growth, measured TFP growth rates will
be biased downward.6
Given the myriad of problems associated with measured rates of TFP growth, it
becomes necessary to have an independent measure of technological improvements, to
assess its eﬀect on capital accumulation and to determine whether it is fully reﬂected
in measured TFP growth rates. One of the innovations of this paper is that we
construct a direct and independent measure of technological improvements. Using a
rich data set of trade ﬂows into the United States, we directly measure the evolution
of each country’s capacity to produce additional products for the world market over
time. This measure of new product technology has the added advantage of being
5Other work examining the process of capital accumulation within countries engaged in interna-
tional trade includes Stiglitz (1970), Ventura (1997), and Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
6There is a substantial literature on terms of trade bias in TFP measurement. See Diewert and
Morrison (1986) and Kohli (2003).
4independent of national income accounts data, and thus does not suﬀer from the
problems which plague TFP measurements.
Empirically, the main diﬃculty in testing for the eﬀect of new product technology
on capital accumulation is the problem of reverse causality: a higher growth rate of
capital can itself allow countries to produce and export a greater range of products
over time. We adopt a number of empirical strategies for dealing with this problem.
Most importantly, we exploit the panel structure of our data set to show that a larger
increment of new product technology in period t−1 leads to a higher rate of capital
accumulation in period t,e v e na f t e rw eh o l dﬁxed the rate of accumulation in period
t − 1. This provides compelling evidence of an eﬀect of new product technology on
the rate of capital accumulation because we are able to hold ﬁxed exogenous factors
responsible for diﬀerent rates of capital accumulation. We also show empirically that
there exists a positive eﬀect of new product technology on capital accumulation even
after we hold ﬁxed the rate of TFP growth. Thus, the contribution of technological
improvements in the form of new product technology is not fully reﬂected in the mea-
sured rate of TFP growth. This suggests that using the TFP growth rate to assess
the contribution of technological improvements—as is done in certain interpretations
of the growth accounting exercise of Young (1995) and others—is likely to lead to an
underestimation of the importance of technological improvements.
The primary policy implication arising from this paper is that developing countries
attempting to raise their investment (and enrollment) rates must pay close attention
to building their technological capacity: in particular, to expanding the range of
products they are able to competitively export to the world market. We do not deny
that ﬁscal measures, ﬁnancial deepening, tax incentives, and other policy measures
can mobilize greater resources and raise rates of capital accumulation. However,
focusing on such measures alone amounts to focusing on only one side of the equation:
unless developing countries acquire the capacity to productively utilize the greater
resources, these resources may not materialize in the ﬁrst place. On the other hand,
5acquiring the expertise to competitively produce and export a wider range of products
is likely to provide powerful incentives to accumulate greater resources.
A detailed look at which policy measures are most eﬀective in enabling countries to
acquire the technological capacity for producing additional products is an interesting
area for further work. In this paper, we focus on marshalling evidence to demonstrate
the eﬀects of such technological improvements on capital accumulation. However,
our measure of technological improvements based on new product varieties opens
up a potentially lucrative research agenda which would seek to explain why certain
countries have been more successful in expanding the range of products over which
they have expertise.
There exists a previous literature on the determinants of savings which addresses
the question of why rates of capital accumulation diﬀer across countries and over
time. While this literature does not focus explicitly on the role of technological
improvements, one of the salient ﬁndings is that high savings rates are associated with
high growth rates.7 Indeed, Carroll and Weil (1994) ﬁnd that growth causes savings,
but that savings does not cause growth. This is a strong suggestion that technological
improvements provide incentives for higher rates of savings and capital accumulation.
Along a somewhat diﬀerent line, Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) show that exogenous
technological improvements in the form of high yielding seed varieties during the
Green Revolution in India led to higher rates of human capital accumulation in areas
where adoption was the greatest.
In order to satisfactorily answer the question posed in this paper, we need to ad-
dress three fundamental issues. First, we need to make the case that our constructed
measure of new product technology is a reasonable measure of technological improve-
ments. Second, we need to provide a theoretical model to understand why such tech-
nological improvements should lead to a higher rate of capital accumulation without
7See Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1996) and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000).
6being fully reﬂected in a higher measured rate of TFP growth. And third, we need
to empirically demonstrate that our measure of new product technology does indeed
lead to a higher rate of capital accumulation without being fully reﬂected in a higher
measured rate of TFP growth. The following three sections address each of these
issues in turn.
2 Measure of Technological Improvements
The concept of technological improvements we use throughout this paper is the ca-
pacity to competitively produce additional products for the world market. Thus,
technology is speciﬁc to product lines and essentially reﬂects knowledge and exper-
tise to competitively organize production of a particular product and deliver it to
buyers on the world market. This is similar to the concept of technology in the
technology, trade, and new growth literature, pioneered by Grossman and Helpman
(1991) and Romer (1990). The one distinction is that in this paper, technology is
explicitly the variety of products a country is able to produce, rather than the variety
of intermediate inputs the country is able to utilize in production or the variety of
products the country is able to consume, both of which are aﬀected by the total vari-
ety of products available in the world to freely trading nations. The model presented
in our paper makes clear why the number of products a country is able to produce is
the appropriate measure of technology for our purposes.
We measure expansion in the number of products each country is able to produce
using data on trade ﬂows into the United States by country of origin. This data,
compiled by Feenstra (1996), is disaggregated into over 1000 product categories (at
the 5-digit SITC level) and covers 160 countries or territories of origin, from 1972-94.8
We focus on the 87 countries for which we have capital stock data. For each country-
year combination, we count the number of ﬁrst-time zero to positive conversions
8The original form of the data contains a larger number of product categories. However, since we
are tracking products over time, in order to avoid problems associated with SITC reclassiﬁcations
in 1978 and 1989, we use only those categories which exist in the data in all years. This leaves us
with slightly over 1000 product categories.
7within product lines. We require each within-category export initiation to be above
$10,000 and we require the initiation to be followed up with one immediate subsequent
year of exports: these requirements are intended to rule out erratic exports and to
ensure that the export initiations are substantial enough to signal that the country
has acquired technological expertise in the product concerned. Then, the number of
such export initiations for each country-year reﬂects the number of new products the
country has learned to produce competitively for the world market during that year.





where Iijt =1if year t is the ﬁrst year in which country i exports product j,a n d
Iijt =0otherwise.9,10
Table A1 provides a snapshot of the raw data. It lists 3 products exported by Thai-
land, starting from the ﬁrst year of exports. This snapshot provides a sense of the
high level of disaggregation in the data. In addition, it is interesting to note that the
product export initiations occur post-1972, and in these three cases, long after 1972.
This feature of the data—the fact that there are many product export initiations by
countries all along the time period—is a result of the high level of disaggregation. If we
were instead using data at the 2-digit level, most “products” would be exported by
all countries in all years, and tracking products over time would not be a meaningful
exercise.
There are a number of additional issues in measuring new product technology using
data on export initiations to the United States. First, we are measuring the number of
9To be more accurate, Iijt =1if year t is the ﬁrst year in which country i exports more than
$10,000 worth of product j AND country i also exports more than $10,000 worth of product j in
year t +1 .
10It is interesting to note that Feenstra and Rose (2000) use disaggregated data on imports into
the United States to rank products by level of technological sophistication: a more sophisticated
product is one which is, on average, imported into the United States in a later year. In our analysis,
we treat all products identically: ﬁrst time exports of any product by a country amounts to an
identical increment of technological capacity.
8new products in exports rather than in domestic output. This is appropriate because
the concept of technology we are interested in is the capacity to become a competitive
producer of the product for the world market. If a product in domestic output is
produced under trade protection and is of shoddy quality, it does not signal that
the country has acquired expertise in that product. For many developing countries
with limited domestic market size, it is important to be able to produce the product
competitively for the world market, and non-zero exports of the product to the United
States serves as a better signal, albeit a noisy signal, that they have acquired the
capacity to do so.
Second, we are using data on exports to the United States, rather than to all desti-
nations. While this choice is dictated by the much higher level of disaggregation of
the data on trade ﬂows into the United States, there are good reasons why this may
not be a serious limitation. First, the United States is the single largest market and
expertise to competitively export a new product is likely to show up in exports to
the United States. In fact, the ability to export to the US market provides us with
a uniform standard against which we assess product expertise. Second, since we are
not measuring the quantity of exports, but rather the 0/1 signal of export initiations
within product categories, our consideration of only the US market is less likely to be
problem.
Of course, distance from the United States is likely to aﬀect the incremental number
of products a country exports to the US over time. In addition, larger countries are
likely to have a more diversiﬁed production base, and this can show up in a larger
incremental number of products exported to the US as transport costs fall over time.
We thus construct an alternative measure of technological improvements, NewTech,
by ﬁltering out the eﬀect of country size and distance as follows:
ln(NewProducts)it = θ1ln(population)it + θ2ln(distance)i + εNEWTECH,it
Distance and country size explain about 15% of the variation in NewProducts in
the pure cross-section and about 10% in the panel. We utilize both measures,
9NewProducts and NewTech, in our empirical work. Table A2 lists the top ten
and bottom ﬁve countries for each of our two measures of expansion in technological
capacity for the 1972-94 period. South Korea, for example, exported 180 product
categories in 1972 and during the 1973-94 period, it acquired the capacity to export
589 additional products. On the other hand, Ethiopia exported 14 products in 1972
and acquired the capacity to export 17 additional products between 1973-94. After
adjusting for distance and country size, India and Mexico drop out of list of ten coun-
tries which have most rapidly expanded their technological capacity. It is reassuring
to note that four of the six developing countries in the list of top ten NewTechcoun-
tries are Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore. While this table lists the
number of new products over the entire 1973-94 period for each country, our empirical
work using panel data divides up the time period into 5-year intervals and uses the
number of new products initiated by countries during each interval.
Of course, as pointed out earlier, it is natural to suspect that our NewProducts and
NewTech measures not only provide a signal of new technological capacity, but are
also inﬂuenced by exogenous capital accumulation and by omitted third variables that
are correlated with exogenous capital accumulation. We would like to call attention
to two points in this regard. First, since we count the 0/1 signal of whether or not a
product is exported, our measure of expansion in technological capacity is likely to be
more exogenous than if we had measured the quantity of exports. Second, when we
t e s tf o rt h ee ﬀect of NewProducts and NewTech on capital accumulation, we will
exploit the panel structure of our data to hold ﬁxed exogenous factors responsible for
diﬀerent rates of capital accumulation.
In order to throw further light on whether it is new technological capacity or merely
capital deepening that is picked up by our measure of NewProducts, it is interesting
to consider some recent informal evidence presented by Hausmann and Rodrik (2002).
The authors take pairs of countries with similar factor endowments—Bangladesh and
Pakistan, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and Taiwan and South Korea—and
10investigate whether the countries within each pair have similar patterns of specializa-
tion, as one would expect. For this purpose, they look at each country’s disaggregated
exports to the United States.
The authors ﬁnd that while similar factor endowments might lead to a similar pat-
tern of specialization at a fairly aggregate 2-digit level, it does very little to explain
which products countries export at a more disaggregated 6-digit level. For example,
out of the top 25 6-digit products in Pakistan’s export basket to the United States,
there are many products for which Bangladesh’s exports are very small or zero. A
similar pattern appears when one looks at Pakistan’s exports of the top 25 prod-
ucts in Bangladesh’s export basket to the United States.11 Thus, as Hausmann and
Rodrik point out, while factor endowments might help us determine that Pakistan
or Bangladesh will export labor-intensive manufactures, that still leaves hundreds
of products up for grabs. It seems reasonable to think, therefore, that acquired
technological capacity must have something to do determining with which of these
disaggregated products and how many of these products each country will produce
over time.
3 Model and Empirical Implications
The model presented here makes explicit how acquiring the technological capacity for
producing and exporting new products can lead to a higher rate of capital accumu-
lation, without being reﬂected in a higher measured rate of TFP growth in the long
run. We merge a Dornbusch, Fischer, Samuelson (1977) model of international trade,
productivity diﬀerences, and specialization with an AK version of the Ramsey model
of accumulation. A technological improvement allows a country to produce and ex-
port an additional range of products. This initially raises TFP and stimulates faster
accumulation. However, greater accumulation in turn induces a decline in TFP back
11It should be pointed out that for both countries, the top 25 6-digit products account for more
than 60 percent of exports to the United States.
11to its initial level as the country experiences a deterioration in its terms of trade.12
In order to understand why more rapid accumulation induces a decline in TFP—
through terms of trade—in the long run, notice that specialization is a fundamental
element of our model. The domestic economy specializes in a certain subset of prod-
ucts, although this pattern of specialization is endogenously determined in equilib-
rium. Then, as a country accumulates capital more rapidly, it increases production
of the commodities in which it specializes, and thereby experiences a decline in its
terms of trade. While it also expands the range of products it produces and exports,
this is not suﬃcient to prevent a terms of trade deterioration.
Our model shares some common features with another model developed separately
by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002). Both models combine international trade and spe-
cialization with AK production and accumulation within countries. In both models,
although production is AK,t h em a r k e ti ne ﬀect imposes diminishing returns. If a
country accumulates capital faster than the rest of the world, it experiences a terms of
trade decline, which reduces the returns to capital and discourages further accumula-
tion. However, there are some crucial diﬀerences between the models. Acemoglu and
Ventura (2002) adopt a ﬁxed pattern of specialization using the Armington assump-
tion that products are diﬀerentiated by country of origin. In our model, the pattern of
specialization is determined endogenously in equilibrium from diﬀerences in relative
productivities. Acemoglu and Ventura also assume that the cross country distrib-
ution of technology is time-invariant and their focus is on explaining how a stable
world income distribution is achieved. On the other hand, our focus is on examining
how technological improvements in within a country aﬀects capital accumulation and
measured TFP growth in that country over time.
12As pointed out earlier, conceptually, it may not necessarily be desirable to have terms of trade
changes aﬀect measures of TFP growth. However, there is a substantial literature explaining why, in
practice, terms of trade changes can indeed aﬀect measured TFP growth rates. Thus, when we refer
to measured TFP growth rates, we will be referring to estimates of TFP growth that are inﬂuenced
by changes in terms of trade.
123.1 A Simple Model
The product space takes the form of a continuum of products spread over the unit
interval [0,1]. There is no innovation: just a ﬁxed product space. There is only one
factor of production, K—construed as a broad measure of capital or of the resources
of production. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the two-country setting, with
a domestic economy and the rest of the world. While the product space is ﬁxed,
technological improvements in the domestic economy can allow it to produce and
export a wider range of products. There is no capital mobility across countries.
Consumption. The K stock is owned by consumers in each country and K can be
accumulated through savings. A representative consumer optimizes intertemporally






where Cτ is a consumption index which depends on the consumption of every product





logc(z)dz .( 2 )
Note that this instantaneous utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, and implies
that each atomistic product z will receive an equal weight in expenditure. Let p(z)
denote the price of each product. Then, the consumer’s expenditure minimization
problem can be solved to show that the price of the consumption index is given by




. The homothetic structure of instantaneous
preferences implies that expenditure will be spread evenly over the unit interval, so
that spending on any interval (z1,z 2) is given by
R z2
z1 p(z)c(z)dz =( z2 − z1)PC.
Production. Both countries are physically able to produce the entire range of prod-
ucts over the unit interval. However, they are able to do so with diﬀerent technology
parameters. In particular, the unit capital requirement for producing product z is
13a(z) in the domestic country and a∗ (z) in the foreign country. Products are ordered
over the [0,1] interval such that relative productivity of the domestic country is falling





0 (z) < 0 (3)
Capital resources earn a return of wK in the domestic economy and w∗
K in the foreign
economy. The size of capital resources in the domestic and foreign economy are given
by K and K∗ respectively. We normalize the price of the z =1product to unity:
p(1) = 1.
Equilibrium without accumulation. Let us ﬁrst ignore the issue of accumulation
and solve for the simple Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson equilibrium with exogenously
given factors of production in the two countries. Note that all products for which
a(z)wK <a ∗(z)w∗
K will be produced exclusively in the domestic country, whereas
the rest will be produced exclusively in the foreign country. The equilibrium relative









where e z is the cutoﬀ product, so that all products in the range (0,e z) are produced
in the domestic country and the rest are produced abroad. Given this specialization
pattern, our speciﬁcation of preferences yielding a uniform distribution of expenditure
over the unit interval, implies that a share e z of world expenditure will be spent on
domestic products. If so, we have that e z (w∗













Equations (4) and (5) together determine the pattern of specialization and the relative
returns of the domestic economy, (e z,ωK), as a function of the technology parameters
and factor endowments. Note that because of our particular normalization of prices,










13The purpose of this model is to explain domestic variables relative to those of a rest of the
14Accumulation. Now, we introduce accumulation and intertemporal optimization
by households. Households in the domestic economy hold capital resources K.T h e y
rent out their capital to ﬁrms and obtain a return wKK. They consume part of this
income and save the rest to add to their resource holdings. So, we have the following
relation for use of ﬁnal output:
wKK = PC+ P ˙ K or
wKK
P
= C + ˙ K (7)





∗ + ˙ K
∗ (8)
Note that we ignore depreciation for simplicity.
Next, intertemporal optimization by households implies that consumption must evolve



























a(h z) , K∗
K
´
indicates that the relative return to capital is a function of
the technology parameters (at the cutoﬀ product) and the relative size of capital
resources.
Steady-State Solution. We solve for a steady-state equilibrium with a constant
share of products e z in the domestic economy. The intuition behind the steady-state
solution is clear. Once we allow accumulation, the capital stocks in the two countries
world benchmark: in particular, to explain the eﬀect of a technological improvement in the domestic
economy relative to the rest of the world. Thus, if we think of the a∗ (z) parameters as being ﬁxed—
and instead focus on changes in the a(z) parameters—then our normalization of prices also ﬁxes
foreign wages as well as all prices for goods produced in the rest of the world.
15respond to the diﬀerent rates of return. In steady-state, with a constant specialization






ﬁxed.14 T h u s ,w eh a v et h a t :
ˆ K = ˆ K
∗ (11)
Furthermore, in each of the two countries in steady-state, the rate of growth of the
capital stock must equal the growth rate of consumption:15
ˆ K = ˆ C and ˆ K
∗ = ˆ C
∗ (12)
So, from equations (11) and (12), we see that consumption must grow at the same rate
in the two countries. If so, since the two countries have the same subjective discount
rate, equations (9) and (10) tell us that the rates of return must be equalized in the










Thus, the endogenous accumulation of capital equalizes the returns to capital in the
two countries in steady-state. Furthermore, (13) immediately implies that
a(˜ z)=a
∗ (˜ z) (14)
In other words, in steady-state, each country produces only those goods in which
it has an absolute advantage.16 Figure 1 depicts the basic steady-state solution in
product space. The exogenously given technology parameters a(˜ z) and a∗ (˜ z) pin
14Note that if e z is constant, then (4) tells us that ωK will also be constant in steady-state. Then,
from (5),w eh a v et h a tK∗
K will be ﬁxed in steady-state.
15We can show that if e z and ωK are constant, then P is also constant in steady-state. This requires
us to assume that the technology parameters a(z) and a∗(z) are either constant or falling uniformly
over time at the same rate in both countries. If so, then













is constant provided that ˜ z and ωK are constant. It follows that ωK
P is constant. Then, equations
(7) and (8) tell us that with a constant steady-state growth rate of capital in each country, we get
equation (12).
16Note that the existence of such a steady-state equilibrium requires us to assume that each
country has an absolute advantage in some range of goods.
16down the technology schedule A(z), and steady-state equilibrium is always reached
at the point where this schedule evaluates to 1. The domestic economy produces and
exports products in the range (0,e z)—i.e. those products in which its technological
expertise is at least as good as the rest of the world: a(˜ z) ≤ a∗ (˜ z). Finally, (13) and
(5) give us that:
K
K + K∗ =˜ z (15)
We thus obtain the clear and simple result that the endogenously determined relative
size of the capital stock in the domestic economy is exactly given by the share of
products in which it has technological expertise.
The intuition for these results is clear. If the domestic economy produces the range
of commodities for which a(z)wK <a ∗(z)w∗
K, and the rates of return to capital are
equalized in steady state, then the domestic economy must produce the range of
commodities for which a(z) <a ∗(z) in the steady state equilibrium. Second, since
consumers spread their expenditure evenly over the unit interval, the share of com-
modities produced in the domestic economy (e z) must equal the domestic economy’s
share of world income. However, if returns to capital are equalized in the steady state,
then the share of commodities produced in the domestic economy (e z) will equal the
domestic economy’s share of the world capital stock. At the root of both steady state
results is the fact that returns to capital are equalized in steady state. And the intu-
ition for that is clear: if the returns to capital in the domestic economy is higher, that
induces faster capital accumulation, which in turn induces a terms of trade decline
and therefore, also a decline in the returns to capital in the domestic economy.
3.2 Empirical Implications of a Technological Improvement.
Suppose that, starting from steady-state, the domestic economy experiences a tech-
nological improvement which allows it to produce an additional increment ∆z1 of
products. Speciﬁcally, this is represented by the domestic economy’s a(z) parameter
falling below a∗ (z) for some range of products. Figure 2 depicts such a technological
improvement. Point A denotes the initial steady-state equilibrium. The technological
17improvement has the following eﬀects:
• There is an immediate jump in the relative returns to capital in the domestic
economy. The equilibrium moves immediately from point A to point B.
• Beginning immediately and over time, the higher relative returns to capital
causes the rate of capital accumulation in the domestic economy to exceed
that of the rest of the world. As a result of this higher rate of accumulation,
the equilibrium moves over time from point B toward the new steady-state
equilibrium at point C.
• We get an immediate expansion in the number of products the domestic coun-
try exports. Over time, we get a further expansion in the number of products
exported by the domestic economy. What is happening here? While the coun-
try’s a(z) parameter fell below a∗ (z) for the entire range (e z,e z0),i td o e sn o t
export all these additional products immediately because the cost of capital in
the domestic economy (wK) rises above that of the rest of the world. As the
relative returns (costs) revert to unity, the country eventually exports all the
additional products in which it has acquired expertise.
One of the empirical implications arising from the model is that if a country has
technological expertise in exporting a higher number of products, relative to its capital
stock, then it should experience a larger growth rate of its capital stock. Recall that
according to equation (15), the relative size of the domestic economy’s capital stock
in steady-state is given by the range of products (z) that it is able to competitively
export. This implies that, if the number of products a country is able to export,





, is higher than that of the rest of the world, then
the country’s capital stock should be growing faster than the rest of the world.
A second empirical implication clear from our discussion above is that, starting from
steady-state or from any other equilibrium point, a technological improvement—in the
18form of an expansion in the number of products a country is able to export—raises the
returns to capital and leads to a faster rate of growth of the capital stock. In fact,
the greater is the increment in new products, the higher is the rate of capital stock
growth.
Finally, measured aggregate productivity or TFP is given by
p(z)Q(z)
K(z) = wK. Produc-
tivity growth is given by ˆ Y − ˆ K =ˆ wK.17 So, while a technological improvement leads
to an initial upward jump in the productivity level, over time, as the capital stock
responds along the adjustment path, ωK reverts to unity. Indeed, in the new steady-
state, the country has a higher relative K stock, but its TFP level is unchanged from
before the technological improvement. In other words, if we compare a country which
has experienced a technological improvement to one which has not, then the former
will record a higher rate of capital accumulation, but no diﬀerence in its rate of TFP
growth.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
In line with the empirical implications emerging from our model, we would like to
test for the eﬀect of our measures of technological improvements (NewProducts &
NewTech) on the rate of capital accumulation. Furthermore, we would like to test
whether this eﬀect of new product technology on capital accumulation remains even
after we hold ﬁxed the rate of TFP growth.
4.1 The Eﬀect of NewProducts
There are two signiﬁcant diﬃculties in implementing the estimation. First, there is
the reverse causality problem: namely, that the rate of capital accumulation itself
can inﬂuence the number of new products a country exports over time. Thus, if there
are reasons other than technological improvements why some countries accumulate
17As pointed out earlier, the measure of TFP we look at is one which would be aﬀected by changes
in terms of trade, because in practice, measured TFP growth rates are likely aﬀected by terms of
trade changes.
19more capital than others—and we agree that there are—then, countries with higher
rates of capital growth will produce more new products simply because there are
more resources available. Recall, however, that we count the 0/1 signal of whether or
not a product is exported, rather than the size of exports itself. Thus, our measure
of expansion in technological capacity is likely to be more exogenous than if we had
measured the quantity of exports. Still, we acknowledge that there can be a reverse
causality problem. Second, there is the problem of spurious correlation: omitted third
variables, which generally increase the eﬃciency of production, can positively impact
both the rate of capital accumulation as well as the number of new products a country
exports.
We employ a number of complementary econometric speciﬁcations to deal with the
problems of estimation. In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we control for a society’s inherent
tendency to accumulate capital using age dependency ratios (i.e. the percentages of
the population over 65 years of age and under 15 years of age).18 Furthermore, we
control for omitted third variables that aﬀect the eﬃciency of production using the
initial level of TFP, as well as the TFP growth rate. We have previously made the
argument that TFP measures are biased by terms of trade changes. In our model,
it is terms of trade augmented TFP (
p(z)Q(z)
K(z) = wK i no u rm o d e l )t h a ta ﬀects the
rate of capital accumulation. Of course, our model does not allow us to think about
third omitted variables that can independently aﬀect both capital accumulation and
NewProducts. Ultimately, our purpose in controlling for TFP and TFP growth is to
not only generally control for omitted third variables, but also to determine whether
the eﬀect of NewProductson capital accumulation holds even after we hold ﬁxed the
rate of TFP growth.
18These demographic variables have been found to explain a signiﬁcant part of the cross-country
variation in savings and investment rates. See Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1996) and Loayza,
Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000).
20The econometric speciﬁcation takes the following form:
KGrit = α0 + α1 ln(K/L)0,it + α2 ln(NewProducts)it + α3 ln(TFP)0,it (16)
+α4 ln(TFPGr)it + α5 (OldDep)it + α6 (Yo u n gDe p )it + ξt + εit
It is worthwhile to point out that the variable NewProducts, rather than the growth
rate of new products, is the appropriate measure of technological improvements here.
This is because the product space is ﬁxed in both the theory (by the unit interval)
a n di nt h ed a t a .A sﬁgure 2 shows, starting from steady-state, a greater increment in
the share of the ﬁxed product space that a country is able to produce (i.e. a greater
∆z or NewProducts) will lead to a greater eﬀect on the growth rate of capital along
the adjustment path.
Our data on capital stock comes from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994), as updated by
Bosworth and Collins (1996). The level and growth rate of TFP have been calculated
using both physical and human capital and using a physical capital share of 0.4.19
The Old and Yo u n g age ratios are from the World Bank. We divide the 1972-94
period into four 5-year periods and one 3-year period (1972-75).20 The estimation is
carried out using time period ﬁxed eﬀects and using a heteroskedasticity-consistent
estimation procedure.
Table 2 presents the results of estimating a number of variants of (16). In the speci-
ﬁcation including all variables except for the TFPGr rate (column 3), the estimated
coeﬃcient on ln(NewProducts) is 0.0040 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. Thus, even after controlling for diﬀerences in a country’s inherent tendency
to save, as well as diﬀerences in the initial level of TFP, a greater expansion in the
number of NewProducts learned is associated with more rapid rates of capital accu-
mulation. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the eﬀect is larger for the
19Our measure of TFP is Y
Kα(HL)1−α, α =0 .4. Human capital data is from Bosworth and Collins
(1996), which itself is based on Barro and Lee (1993).
20The results are essentially unchanged if we exclude the initial 3-year period. Of course, KGrit
and NewProductsit are each annual averages over the time period concerned.
21subset of non-OECD developing countries (column 4).21 This is not diﬃcult to un-
derstand. In developing countries, technological improvements are more likely to take
the form of acquiring the expertise to produce a greater share of the ﬁxed product
space. The OECD countries likely already possess the ability to produce products in
most of the product categories in our data. In these countries, technological improve-
ments are more likely to take the form of either increased product quality or greater
variety within certain product categories.
Comparing columns 3 & 4 with columns 5 & 6, we see that including the TFPGrrate
in the speciﬁcation reduces the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient on ln(NewProducts),
although the coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The reduced
magnitude can be due to a number of reasons. First, as is our intention, the TFPGr
rate may be controlling for improvements in omitted third variables (e.g. a reduction
in political instability) which positively aﬀect both NewProductsand the growth rate
of capital. This is akin to the reason why including the initial level of TFP reduces
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on ln(NewProducts). Second, there is the possibility
that a technological improvement in the form of acquiring the capacity to produce
new products can itself be reﬂe c t e di nah i g h e rr a t eo fTFPGr during the 5-year
period. This is not contrary to the predictions of the theory. Recall that according
to the theory, TFP is unaﬀected by technological improvements only in the long run,
once the capital stock has responded fully to the improvement. Along the adjustment
path, NewProducts can positively impact TFP (and hence the measured TFPGr
rate over the 5-year period). On the other hand, the empirical ﬁnding in columns 5 &
6 that the eﬀect of NewProducts on the growth rate of capital remains statistically
signiﬁcant even after holding ﬁxed the TFPGrrate, suggests that the measured TFP
growth rates do not fully capture improvements in technological capacity. In other
words, the results indicate that new product technology does lead to a higher rate of
capital accumulation, without being fully reﬂected in a higher measured rate of TFP
21For the OECD countries, the estimated coeﬃcient is actually negative and signiﬁcant, although
the statistical signiﬁcance of the negative coeﬃcient disappears when subjected to robustness checks.
22growth.
Finally, examining the eﬀect of including the Old and Yo u n g age ratios in the es-
timation (compare columns 1 and 2) serves as an indirect test of reverse causality.
It is reasonable to expect that the age ratios have an eﬀect on the growth rate of
capital, but no independent eﬀect on NewProducts. Indeed, as we expected, the
magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient on ln(NewProducts) declines from 0.0084 to
0.0057 (for the full sample of countries), suggesting that reverse causality is a prob-
lem. While the estimated coeﬃcient remains statistically signiﬁcant even after we
use the Old and Yo u n gage ratios to control for exogenous reasons why savings rates
diﬀer across countries, there is still the nagging concern that we have not controlled
for all exogenous reasons for why some countries save more than others. Thus, a plau-
sible argument can be made that our results from the estimations in Table 2 do not
conclusively demonstrate causality. We thus turn to our second set of speciﬁcations,
w h e r ew el o o ka tt h ee ﬀect of the initial number of Products on the growth rate of
capital.
4.2 The Eﬀect of the Initial Number of Products
According to the theory, a higher initial number of products, relative to the initial
level of the capital stock, leads to a faster growth rate of capital. Since the relative
size of an economy’s K stock in steady state is fully determined by the number of
Products (z) in which it has technological expertise (see equation 15), a lower level
of the K stock relative to the number of Productsimplies that the country is farther
behind its steady-state level of K, and hence that it must experience a higher rate
of capital accumulation. In fact, the theory predicts that conditional on the initial
level of capital, both Products0,it as well as NewProductsit should have an eﬀect on
the growth rate of capital: the former because it determines the current steady-state
level of capital and the latter because it pushes the steady-state level of capital farther
ahead of the current level of K.
23Before we test for the eﬀect of both variables jointly, we test separately for the eﬀect
of the initial number of products. The speciﬁcation takes the following form:
KGrit = α0 + α1 ln(K/L)0,it + α2 ln(Products)0,it + α3 ln(TFP)0,it (17)
+α4 ln(TFPGr)it + α5 (OldDep)it + α6 (Yo u n gDe p )it + ξt + εit
Recall that Products0,it here is the cumulative number of products that each country
has ever exported up to the beginning of each 5-year period. We use the cumulative
number of products, rather than the actual number of products exported in the
particular year corresponding to the beginning of each 5-year period, because we seek
to measure the range of products in which the country has knowledge or technological
expertise. Thus, the underlying notion is that product-speciﬁc knowledge or expertise,
once acquired, is not lost.
The results of the estimation are presented in table 3. The estimated coeﬃcient on
the initial number of Productsis positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
in all variants of speciﬁcation (17), for the sample of non-OECD developing countries.
Since the initial number of products precedes the growth rate of capital over the 5-
year period, there is a good case to be made for a causal interpretation of this ﬁnding.
Thus, developing countries starting out with expertise in producing a larger number
of Products relative to their initial stock of capital will experience a faster rate of
capital accumulation.
In the speciﬁcation including the initial level of TFP (in addition to the initial number
of Products), the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient on Products0,it is much
reduced (columns 4 and 5). Indeed, for the full sample of countries, the estimated
coeﬃcient on Products0,it is not signiﬁcant at the 5% level (although it remains
signiﬁcant at the 5% level for the sample of developing countries). There is, however,
a question about whether we want to include the initial level of TFP when testing
for the eﬀect of the initial number of Products. On the one hand, including the TFP
level allows us to control for spurious correlation induced by omitted third variables
24that separately aﬀect both Products0,it and KGrit. On the other hand, the theory
predicts that a higher initial number of Products, compared to the initial K stock,
will imply that the country is farther behind its steady state, and this will be reﬂected
in a higher TFP (ωK in the model).22 Thus, we really have no compelling reason for
believing that in speciﬁcation (17), the initial number of Productswill have an eﬀect
on the growth rate of capital even after we hold ﬁxed the initial level of TFP.
As discussed above, the theory predicts that both the initial number of Products as
well as the NewProductsincrement over the 5-year period should have an eﬀect on the
growth rate of capital. The results in columns 8 and 9 (of table 3) show that when both
variables are included in the speciﬁcation, the estimated coeﬃcient on NewProducts
is statistically signiﬁcant, but that on the initial number of Productsis not. In fact,
if, in addition to ln(NewProducts)it and ln(Products)0,it, we include the TFPGr
rate in the speciﬁcation (not shown), the estimated coeﬃcient on ln(NewProducts)it
is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. The problem here is that the two variables,
Products0,it and NewProductsit are highly collinear—the simple bivariate correlation
between the two variables is 0.77. It therefore becomes diﬃcult to obtain precise
estimates of the individual eﬀects of these two variables within the same speciﬁcation.
Still, in all such speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients on the two variables are jointly highly
signiﬁcant.
22Note the distinction here from the issue discussed in the previous section about whether a
larger NewProducts is fully reﬂected in a higher TFPGr rate over a 5-year period. Starting from
steady-state, a larger NewProducts over the 5-year period can stimulate a quick response from the
capital stock, such that the level of TFP at the end of the period is unchanged from the beginning,
and there is no eﬀect on the measured TFPGr rate over the 5-year period. Thus, including both
NewProductsand TFPGr in speciﬁcation (16) allowed us to legitimately test for the eﬀect of
NewProducts on KGr while holding ﬁxed the TFPGr rate. In contrast, the theory predicts that
in speciﬁcation (17), a higher initial number of products, relative to the initial capital stock, must
necessarily be reﬂected in a higher initial level of TFP. Thus, we have no legitimate reason to test
for the eﬀect of Products0,it on KGrit, while holding ﬁxed the initial level of TFP.
254.3 Causality Tests of Eﬀect of NewProductson Capital Growth
A counter-argument to our causal interpretation of the estimated positive coeﬃ-
cient on ln(Products)0,it can be made on the grounds that KGrit is correlated with
KGri,t−1. Then, since KGrit−1 c a nl e a dt oah i g h e rNewProductsi,t−1 (the reverse
causality problem), and hence lead to a higher Products0,it,o u rﬁndings in section
4.2 may still not conclusively demonstrate causality. We thus turn next to looking
at the eﬀect of the lagged NewProducts increment on the rate of capital growth. In
doing so, we will also hold ﬁxed the lagged growth rate of capital.
The theoretical justiﬁcation for looking at the eﬀect of NewProductsi,t−1 on KGrit
is clear: given a technological improvement in the form of NewProductsi,t−1,t h eK
stock will likely not respond fully in period t − 1. Some of the adjustment to the
new steady state will carry over into period t,s ot h a tKGrit will also be positively
impacted. On the other hand, since NewProductsi,t−1 precedes KGrit,t h er e v e r s e
causality argument is not immediately apparent. However, as explained above, KGrit
c o u l db ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hKGri,t−1 through unobserved third variables, and there
exists the reverse causality concern that KGri,t−1 can be responsible for some part of
NewProductsi,t−1. Therefore, we also control for KGri,t−1.T h es p e c i ﬁcation takes
the following form:
KGrit = β0 + β1KGri,t−1 + β2 ln(K/L)0,it + β3 ln(NewProducts)i,t−1 (18)
+β4 ln(TFP)0,i,t−1 + β5 ln(TFPGr)i,t−1 + ζt + νit
The results from estimating several variants of this speciﬁcation are presented in
Tables 4 and 5. The estimates in table 4 do not hold ﬁxed the lagged growth rate of
capital. The estimates in this table show that the lagged NewProductst−1 increment
is associated with a higher growth rate of capital in period t. The more compelling
ﬁndings are in table 5, where we hold ﬁxed the growth rate of capital in period
t − 1. This allows us to hold ﬁxed unobserved factors responsible for diﬀerences in
the lagged growth rate of capital, through which KGri,t−1 aﬀects NewProductsi,t−1.
Thus, we are able to take care of the reverse causality concern that NewProductsi,t−1
26could have resulted from KGri,t−1, which is correlated with KGrit.23 The estimated
coeﬃcient on NewProductsi,t−1 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
thus providing compelling evidence that a technological improvement, in the form of
acquiring the capacity to produce and export new products, leads to a higher rate of
capital accumulation. Furthermore, the estimates in columns 3 and 4 show that even
after we hold ﬁxed the initial level of TFP and the TFPGr rate in period t−1,t h e
eﬀect of NewProductsi,t−1 on the growth rate of capital is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. This provides compelling evidence that the contribution of a technological
improvement—in the form of new product technology—is not fully reﬂected in a higher
rate of TFP growth.
It is worthwhile to point out that the estimated coeﬃcient on ln(NewProducts)i,t−1
in table 5 is likely biased toward zero. Since NewProductsi,t−1 is expected to have an
eﬀect on KGri,t−1,b yh o l d i n gﬁxed KGri,t−1 we are not only holding ﬁxed exogenous
factors responsible for a higher growth rate of capital, but also holding ﬁxed the
stimulus on KGri,t−1 from NewProductsi,t−1. Thus, the estimates are biased against
ﬁnding an eﬀect of new product technology on the rate of capital accumulation.
In light of this fact, the ﬁnding of a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect is all the more
compelling.
Finally, as a robustness check, the estimates in table 6 test for the eﬀect of our
NewTech variable on the rate of capital accumulation. Recall that this variable was
constructed as an alternative measure of technological improvements by ﬁltering out
factors such as population and distance which may have led some countries to export
a larger increment of products to the United States. The results show that NewTech
has a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the rate of capital accumulation even
after holding ﬁxed the rate of TFP growth, both in the full sample of countries and
23Note that in the speciﬁcations in table 5, it is not necessary to hold ﬁxed the age dependency
ratios because by holding ﬁxed KGri,t−1, we are already holding ﬁxed exogenous reasons why rates
of capital growth diﬀer across countries. Thus, we are doing better than only holding ﬁxed Old and
Yo u n gage ratios.
27in the sample of non-OECD developing countries.
5 Concluding Comments
We have used a range of speciﬁcations to control for problems of reverse causation
and omitted third variable-induced spurious correlation in testing for the eﬀect of our
measure of technological improvements on the rate of capital accumulation. While
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient falls upon controlling for these problems, the eﬀect
remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the eﬀect of new product
technology on capital accumulation remains signiﬁcant even after holding ﬁxed the
rate of TFP growth. Thus, technological improvements in the form of acquiring
the expertise to produce and export new products leads to a higher rate of capital
accumulation, without being fully reﬂected in a higher measured rate of TFP growth.
Both international economists and macroeconomists have struggled to understand the
relative contributions of available resources and technological capacity on the struc-
ture and size of production. On the one hand, the empirical Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek
literature has used two pieces of information—available factors of production and as-
sumptions about sectoral factor intensities across countries—to predict the structure
of production. On the other hand, the growth accounting exercise implements a sim-
ple decomposition of economic growth into the contributions of capital accumulation
and TFP growth. This paper shows that available resources can respond endoge-
nously to an expansion in technological capacity. We make explicit the nature of
such technological improvements—the acquired capacity to produce and export new
products—and we also show that such improvements are not fully reﬂected in a higher
growth rate of total factor productivity. True, high rates of economic growth are
associated with high growth rates of capital and unspectacular rates of TFP growth.
However, these observations may be because stellar technological improvements stim-
ulate high growth rates of capital and are not reﬂected in stellar measured rates of
TFP growth. Thus, while we have no disagreements with the simple decomposition
of the growth accounting exercise, our work shows that such simple decompositions
28lack power to make causal interpretations.
This paper opens up an interesting area for further research. While we have shown
that an expansion in the range of products within a country’s technological capacity
provides incentives for more rapid accumulation of capital, there exists a promising
research agenda in exploring why some countries have been more successful in acquir-
ing the capacity to produce and export a wider range of products over time. Such an
exercise is also likely to yield a richer set of policy guidelines about what countries
can do to expand the range of products over which they have technological expertise.
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32Table A1.  Snapshot of the Raw Data:
3 Products Exported by Thailand, starting from the first year of exports
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION COUNTRY SITCCODE YEAR EXPORTS
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 87 50812
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 88 129276
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 89 1700958
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 90 1639915
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 91 1884810
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 92 2783445
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 93 2422866
BASIC METAL SAFES THAILAND 69912 94 2317455
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 85 52889
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 86 55964
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 88 81588
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 89 1353654
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 91 604647
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 92 1091445
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 93 658398
NON-ELECTRIC POWER HAND TOOLS THAILAND 74511 94 829940
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 87 226941
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 88 626101
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 89 1230986
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 90 2024720
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 91 2500996
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 92 2367285
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 93 2626161
INNER TUBES OF TYRES THAILAND 62591 94 1912430
33Table A2.  NewProducts and NewTech for select countries, 1972-94
New Products COUNTRY Products New Products NEWTECH COUNTRY NEWTECH
Rank 1972 1972-94 Rank
1 China 96 763 1 Singapore 1.98
2 Brazil 217 609 2 Israel 1.668
3 South Korea 180 589 3 New Zealand 1.612
4 Mexico 370 573 4 Australia 1.552
5 Belgium-Lux 331 545 5 Taiwan 1.472
6 Taiwan 285 545 6 Malaysia 1.358
7 Australia 191 538 7 Ireland 1.253
8 Israel 151 519 8 South Korea 1.238
9 India 176 500 9 Belgium-Lux 1.171
10 Spain 305 493 10 South Africa 1.149
83 Malawi 4 19 83 Sudan -1.938
84 Algeria 7 18 84 Algeria -2.162
85 Ethiopia 14 17 85 Uganda -2.331
86 Uganda 5 13 86 Ethiopia -2.332
87 Rwanda 6 6 87 Rwanda -2.841
Note:  This table only lists the cumulative number of new products over the entire 1973-94 period.
Our constructed measure of new products is of course annual and is aggregated into annual 5-year averages 
for the empirical estimations.
34Table A3. Sample of Developing and OECD Countries
Developing Countries
DZA Algeria IND India PRY Paraguay
ARG Argentina IDN Indonesia PER Peru
BGD Bangladesh IRN Iran PHL Philippines
BOL Bolivia ISR Israel RWA Rwanda
BRA Brazil JAM Jamaica SEN Senegal
CMR Cameroon JOR Jordan SLE Sierra Leone
CHL Chile KEN Kenya SGP Singapore
CHN China KOR Korea ZAF South Africa
COL Colombia MDG Madagascar LKA Sri Lanka
CRI Costa Rica MWI Malawi SDN Sudan
CIV Cote d’Ivoire MYS Malaysia TWN Taiwan
CYP Cyprus MLI Mali TZA Tanzania
DOM Dominican Rep. MLT Malta THA Thailand
ECU Ecuador MUS Mauritius TTO Trinidad and Tobago
EGY Egypt MEX Mexico TUN Tunisia
SLV El Salvador MAR Morocco TUR Turkey
ETH Ethiopia MOZ Mozambique UGA Uganda
GHA Ghana MMR Myanmar URY Uruguay
GTM Guatemala NIC Nicaragua VEN Venezuela
GUY Guyana NGA Nigeria ZAR Zaire/D. R .Congo
HTI Haiti PAK Pakistan ZMB Zambia
HND Honduras PAN Panama ZWE Zimbabwe
OECD Countries
AUS Australia ITA Italy
AUT Austria JPN Japan
BEL Belgium NLD Netherlands
CAN Canada NZL New Zealand
DNK Denmark NOR Norway
FIN Finland PRT Portugal
FRA France ESP Spain
DEU Germany SWE Sweden
GRC Greece CHE Switzerland
ISL Iceland GBR United Kingdom
IRL Ireland
3536Table 2.  Panel Estimates of Capital Growth Equations
Effect of  NewProducts
Dependent variable is KGr t  (Standard Errors in parentheses )
1234567
Sample Full Full Full Developing Full Developing OECD
Countries Countries
Constant 0.1173** 0.2342** 0.2586** 0.2625** 0.2324** 0.2334** 0.4277**
(0.0120) (0.0310) (0.0306) (0.0331) (0.0310) (0.0341) (0.0789)
ln(K/L)0,t -0.0073** -0.0052** -0.0170** -0.0168** -0.0172** -0.0170** -0.0254**
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0064)
ln(NewProducts )t  0.0084** 0.0057** 0.0040** 0.0048** 0.0033** 0.0041** -0.0045**
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014)
ln(TFP)0,t  0.0392** 0.0392** 0.0437** 0.0440** -0.0024
(0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0074)
TFPGRt  0.2473** 0.2538** 0.0037
(0.0526) (0.0564) (0.0888)
Old_Dep_Ratio -0.0063** -0.0062** -0.0060** -0.0058** -0.0058** -0.0030**
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0008)
Young_Dep_Ratio -0.0025** -0.0022** -0.0024** -0.0017** -0.0018** -0.0015**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2  0.245 0.332 0.449 0.447 0.484 0.484 0.728
Number of Obs. 429 429 429 324 429 324 105
Equations estimated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
** & * denote coeff is significantly different from zero at 5% & 10% level respectively
37Table 3.  Panel Estimates of Capital Growth Equations:
Effect of  Initial # Products 
Dependent variable is KGr t  (Standard Errors in parentheses )
12345678 9
Sample Full Full Developing Full Developing Full Developing Full Developing
Countries Countries Countries Countries
Constant 0.1064** 0.2274** 0.2381** 0.2307** 0.2300** 0.2084** 0.2182** 0.2307** 0.2423**
(0.0125) (0.0298) (0.0325) (0.0293) (0.0319) (0.0308) (0.0338) (0.0300) (0.0328)
ln(K/L)0,t -0.0067** -0.0044** -0.0041* -0.0166** -0.0165** -0.0039** -0.0036* -0.0052** -0.0050**
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0021)
ln(Initial # Products)0,t  0.0056** 0.0044** 0.0055** 0.0019 0.0029** 0.0046** 0.0057** 0.0011 0.0010
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0029)
ln(NewProducts )t  0.0049** 0.0061**
(0.0021) (0.0028)
ln(TFP)0,t  0.0444** 0.0450**
(0.0046) (0.0048)
TFPGRt  0.2559** 0.2628** 0.1550** 0.1547**
(0.0496) (0.0534) (0.0631) (0.0673)
Old_Dep_Ratio -0.0069** -0.0075** -0.0062** -0.0062** -0.0065** -0.0073** -0.0063** -0.0070**
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Young_Dep_Ratio -0.0026** -0.0029** -0.0018** -0.0019** -0.0023** -0.0026** -0.0025** -0.0027**
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2  0.210 0.320 0.312 0.479 0.479 0.335 0.327 0.332 0.328
Number of Obs. 435 435 330 435 330 435 330 429 324
Equations estimated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
** & * denote coeff is significantly different from zero at 5% & 10% level respectively
3
8Table 4.  Causality Tests of NewProducts on Capital Growth
Dependent variable is KGr t  (Standard Errors in parentheses )
12345 6
Sample Full Full Developing Full Developing Developing
Countries Countries Countries
Constant 0.1017** 0.2553** 0.2617** 0.2919** 0.2955** 0.2700**
(0.0142) (0.0319) (0.0344) (0.0320) (0.0336) (0.0314)
ln(K/L)0,t -0.0085** -0.0079** -0.0076** -0.0164** -0.0166** -0.0167**
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0028)
ln(NewProducts )t-1  0.0085** 0.0046** 0.0051** 0.0035** 0.0039** 0.0030**
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015)
ln(TFP)0,t-1  0.0262** 0.0271** 0.0343**
(0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0048)
TFPGRt-1   0.3704**
(0.0607)
Old_Dep_Ratiot  -0.0069** -0.0071** -0.0070** -0.0065** -0.0068**
(0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Young_Dep_Ratiot  -0.0031** -0.0034** -0.0031** -0.0033** -0.0028**
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2  0.222 0.352 0.361 0.407 0.421 0.509
Number of Obs. 343 343 259 343 259 259
Equations estimated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
** & * denote coeff is significantly different from zero at 5% & 10% level respectively
39Table 5.  Panel Causality Tests of NewProducts on Capital Growth
Dependent variable is KGr t  (Standard Errors in parentheses )
1234 5
Sample Full Full Full Developing OECD
Countries
Constant 0.0463** 0.0561** 0.0743** 0.0628** 0.0648
(0.0108) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0173) (0.0467)
ln(K/L)0,t -0.0049** -0.0069** -0.0094** -0.0087** -0.0061
(0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0045)
KGr t-1  0.6595** 0.6427** 0.5984** 0.5760** 0.6040**
(0.0384) (0.0432) (0.0408) (0.0449) (0.0753)
ln(NewProducts )t-1  0.0041** 0.0039** 0.0031** 0.0035** 0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0014)
ln(TFP)0,t-1  0.0059 0.0124** 0.0141** 0.0036
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0069)
TFPGRt-1   0.2709** 0.2795** 0.0903
(0.0482) (0.0511) (0.0936)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2  0.611 0.614 0.663 0.670 0.670
Number of Obs. 343 343 343 259 84
Equations estimated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
** & * denote coeff is significantly different from zero at 5% & 10% level respectively
40Table 6.  Tests for Effect of NewTech on Capital Growth
Dependent variable is KGr t  (Standard Errors in parentheses )
1234 5
Sample Full Full Developing Full Developing
Countries Countries
Constant 0.1372** 0.2400** 0.2410** 0.0850** 0.0769**
(0.0146) (0.0311) (0.0342) (0.0163) (0.0183)
ln(K/L)0,t -0.0078** -0.0177** -0.0174** -0.0101** -0.0095**
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025)
KGrt-1  0.5962** 0.5741**
(0.0411) (0.0454)
NewTech t-1  0.0037** 0.0044**
(0.0011) (0.0013)
ln(TFP)0,t-1  0.0131** 0.0143**
(0.0047) (0.0053)
TFPGRt-1   0.2658** 0.2688**
(0.0477) (0.0507)
NewTech t  0.0091** 0.0038** 0.0050**
(0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0019)
ln(TFP)0,t  0.0444** 0.0443**
(0.0045) (0.0049)
TFPGRt  0.2426** 0.2500**
(0.0532) (0.0568)
Old_Dep_Ratiot  -0.0057** -0.0059**
(0.0007) (0.0013)
Young_Dep_Ratiot  -0.0017** -0.0017**
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2  0.242 0.485 0.485 0.664 0.672
Number of Obs. 429 429 324 343 259
Equations estimated using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Partial Plot of KGrt   vs.  ln(NewProducts)t-1  :


































































































































































































































































Figure 4.  Partial Plot of  KGrt   vs.  NewTecht-1 :
        Controlling for  KGrt-1  and  ln(K/L)0   .
42